Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies
Volume 15

Article 2

1-1-2006

Freedom of Religion in Canada and France: Implications for
Citizenship and Judgment
Madeleine Sinclair

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/djls

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative
Works 3.0 License.
Recommended Citation
Madeleine Sinclair, "Freedom of Religion in Canada and France: Implications for Citizenship and
Judgment" (2006) 15 Dal J Leg Stud 39.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For
more information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca.

FREEDOM OF RELIGION . . . 39

FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN CANADA AND
FRANCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR CITIZENSHIP AND
JUDGMENT
MADELEINE SINCLAIR†

ABSTRACT
Despite the increasing tendency to relegate religion to the private sphere,
the role of religion in public debate remains important and contested.
Given the reality that these debates usually results in binding decisions
that must be accepted by all groups, this paper engages the idea that
perhaps the goal in a pluralistic society should not be to simply garner
unanimous agreement or even the greatest consensus possible, but
to ensure that decisions be seen by all members of a society as valid,
whether or not they accord with individual or collective views.
Arendt’s theory of judgment holds that it is the use of the ‘enlarged
mentality’, the consideration of others’ perspectives, that allows
judgment to be seen as valid by the judging subjects. Nedelsky, in turn,
focuses on how this approach to judgment helps us theorize about the
optimal role of religiously based argument in the public space. This
paper  examines  what  Nedelsky’s  theory  may  have  to  offer  in  the  speciﬁc  
contexts of Canada and France. While these two jurisdictions have much
in common, important distinctions emerge with respect to the challenges
posed by religious diversity and what is driving the responses to these
challenges.
Through a comparative analysis, this paper begins by attempting to
delineate the fundamental differences between the approaches of both
countries to freedom of religion and religious diversity. An analysis
is then undertaken with respect to the implications for both Canada’s
and France’s capacities to engage a theory of judgment that uses the
enlarged mentality to consider religious perspectives.
†
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The   paper   is   organized   as   follows:   ﬁrstly   the   legal   systems,   general  
text of the constitutions and how these relate to religion in society is
compared; secondly the model of church and state relationship in both
countries is examined; thirdly, the discussion is situated in the greater
context of France’s approach generally to the management of diversity;
ﬁnally  a  comparative  analysis  of  the  content  and  delineation  of  freedom  
of religion in both jurisdictions is undertaken
The study essentially concludes that France may be neither interested
nor capable of including religious perspectives in its deliberations and
in that respect the validity attained when the enlarged mentality is used
in judgment may not be achievable. While the paper concludes that
Nedelsky’s judgment may be possible in Canada, the recent example
of Muslim personal law (Sharia) in Ontario is used to illustrate that,
despite all of the right conditions, political will is crucial if we are to
follow   through   with   the   politically   difﬁcult   decisions   that   follow   from  
them.
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INTRODUCTION
One does not have to look further than the front page of a national newspaper in either Canada or France to appreciate the important and contested role religion currently plays in public debate, be it the case of
headscarves, kirpans, or prayer space in schools, the place of Sharia in
family law arbitration, or even the debates surrounding same-sex marriage. Many would also likely agree that there has been a tendency in the
last  ﬁfty  years  or  so  to  “relegate  religion  to  the  private  sphere;;  to  suggest that it should have as little as possible to do with economic, social,
and political life.”1 It may be that it is time to question the assumptions
underlying this approach and query whether it is still appropriate given
today’s socio-political climate. The reality in any democratic society is
that, at some point, these debates result in binding decisions that, at least
for a time, must be accepted by all groups whether they accord with the
views of the group or not.2 The challenge therefore lies in the reality of
a pluralistic society: perhaps the goal should not be simply to garner
unanimous agreement or even the greatest consensus possible, but also
to ensure that decisions be seen by all members of a society as valid,
whether or not they accord with individual or collective views.
Hannah Arendt outlined a preliminary theory of judgment before
she  died  in  which  the  central  concept  is  the  “enlarged  mentality,”  a  concept she borrowed from Kant.3 Essentially, the theory maintains that
judgment is distinct from both provable truth claims and subjective
preference  in  that  it  involves  the  act  of  reﬂecting  on  a  matter  from  the  
perspective of others. Because judgment is itself an inherently subjective process, it cannot compel others to concur in the way that truth
claims  can.  It  is  speciﬁcally  the  act  of  using  the  “enlarged  mentality,”  
of considering others’ perspectives, that allows judgment to be seen as
valid by the judging subjects.4
1

Claude  Ryan,  “In  Place  of  a  Foreword”  in  Douglas  Farrow,  ed., Recognizing
Religion in a Secular Society: Essays in Pluralism, Religion, and Public Policy
(Montreal:  McGill-Queen’s  University  Press,  2004)  ix  [Ryan,  “In  Place”].
2
Ibid.
3
Ronald Beiner, ed., Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy
(Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  Press,  1982).  
4
J.  Nedelsky,  “Legislative  Judgment  and  the  Enlarged  Mentality:  Taking  Religious  
Perspectives”  [forthcoming  2006]  at  2  [Nedelsky,  “Legislative  Judgment”].  
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In her work, Nedelsky focuses on how this approach to judgment
helps us theorize about the optimal role of spiritually or religiously
based   argument   in   the   public   space.   Although   Nedelsky   speciﬁcally  
does not hold her argument to be valid in all times and places, this paper
intends to examine what her theory may have to offer in the contexts of
Canada and France.
Although  her  inquiry  is  speciﬁcally  focused  on  the  signiﬁcance  of  
judgment in legislative functions, namely deliberation on the common
good and the articulation and evolution of constitutional values, her theory may also have important implications for judgment in the judicial
context. Her central claim is that thinking about legislative functions in
terms of judgment and the enlarged mentality will help us develop the
norms  necessary  for  religiously  based  argument.  She  posits  that  “neither  
the secularist norms nor the most vocal of the religious voices provides
us   with   a   good   model   for   reﬂecting   on   optimal   contemporary   norms  
for religiously based argument in the public sphere,” emphasising that
elucidating these norms becomes crucial as religiously based policy positions grow in importance.5
This paper considers both legislative and judicial judgment because
pragmatically, the site of judgment depends entirely on where these deliberations and articulations are taking place.6 One of the central arguments of this paper is precisely that the site, or the ways in which
institutional structures operate in a given jurisdiction, may make all the
difference.
One can legitimately argue that Canada and France have much in
common. Both are western, liberal, functioning democratic states with
signiﬁcant  immigrant  populations.7 It is also fair to say that with re5

Ibid. at 4.
A full discussion of why the theory may or may not be applicable to the judicial
context is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is crucial for this paper to
consider the implications of judgment using the enlarged mentality in the judicial
context. The Chief Justice of Canada recently reminded us of the importance of the
judicial context and rather important role judges play in constitutional law making
in  Canada:  “[T]he  rule  of  law  requires  judges  to  uphold  unwritten  constitutional  
norms, even in the face of clearly enacted laws or hostile public opinion”. Beverley
McLachlin  C.J.,  “Unwritten  Constitutional  Principles:  What  is  Going  On?”  (Lecture  
presented  at  the  Lord  Cooke  of  Thorndon  Lecture,  University  of  Wellington,  New  
Zealand,  December  2005)  [unpublished].
7
The  2001  census  in  Canada  revealed  that  immigrants  accounted  for  18.4%  of  
6
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spect to diversity, both countries subscribe to a version of liberalism
with limits in terms of what forms of cultural diversity can be accommodated and embraced within the larger society.8 In fact, a study of both
countries reveals agreement that in order to sustain a democratic constitutional order, the state must be able to promulgate certain civic ideals.
What  these  civic  ideals  are  however,  as  well  as  their  consequent  effects  
on   the   management  of  diversity,  differs   signiﬁcantly  in  the  two   jurisdictions. In both countries, diversity presents political and legal challenges alike, and has important implications for citizenship. Yet in these
two countries faced with fairly similar challenges, important differences
emerge, not only in the actual responses to the challenges but perhaps
more interestingly from an analytical perspective, in what drives those
very responses.
In France, one of the most important civic ideals being promulgated
by  the  state  is  the  doctrine  of  “laïcité” or secularism. In fact, one of the
most crucial things to understand when engaging in a comparative study
involving France is the central role that laïcité plays in the neo-republican discourse on national identity.9 Although one may be tempted to
translate laïcité as the French equivalent of secularization, it is important to understand how qualitatively different it is from a mere statement
about the separation of church and state. There is an important distinction to be drawn between a secular state clearly separate from the church
and secularism as a doctrine and ideal of citizenship promulgated vigorously by the state.10
the population <www.statcan.ca> while in France, preliminary analysis of the 2004
census  revealed  that  immigrants  accounted  for  9.6%  of  the  population  <www.insee.
fr>.
8
I am referring here to Kymlicka’s liberal theory of minority rights that posits that
liberal principles impose two fundamental limitations on minority rights. Firstly, a
liberal conception of minority rights will not usually justify ‘internal restrictions’,
the demand by a minority culture to restrict the basic civil or political liberties of its
own members. Secondly, a liberal conception of minority rights, while being more
sympathetic to demands for ‘external protections’ that reduce their vulnerability to
the decisions of the larger society, still imposes limitations to the extent that external
protections are only legitimate as long as they promote equality between groups.
Will  Kymlicka,  Multiculturalism Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights
(Oxford:  Clarendon  Press,  1995)  at  152.    
9     Michael,  Leruth  “The  Neorepublican  Discourse  on  French  National  Identity”  
(1998)  16  French  Politics  &  Society  46  [Leruth,  “French  National”].
10
For the purposes of this paper laïcité  will  be  used  to  speciﬁcally  denote  the  
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The challenge with the French doctrine then may be to keep secularism from becoming just another sectarianism, but one with universal
pretension.11  Perhaps  this  is  the  very  challenge  Nedelsky  has  in  mind  
when advocating for the creation of a space and norms through which
religious   perspectives   can   be   both   heard   and   respected?   Through   a  
comparative analysis of religious diversity and freedom of religion in
Canada and France, this paper attempts to delineate the fundamental
differences in the responses of both countries to religious diversity and
to analyse the implications these differences have for their capacity to
engage a theory of judgment which uses the enlarged mentality to consider religious perspectives.
The study essentially concludes that France may be neither interested nor capable of including religious perspectives in its deliberations
and in that respect the validity attained when the enlarged mentality is
used in judgment may not be achievable. The question remains, however, whether Nedelsky’s judgment is possible in Canada. The claim
I   make   about   France   is   grounded   in   three   signiﬁcant   differences   that  
emerge as a result of the comparative analysis. Firstly, the differences in
the two countries’ church-state models, contrasting the French doctrine
of laïcité with the state’s duty of neutrality with respect to religion in
Canada. Related, is a philosophical difference that emerges between the
two countries with respect to the conception of how and why individual
autonomy ought to be protected. Secondly, and very much related, is the
role that laïcité plays as the normative ideal of citizenship in the neorepublican discourse on French national identity which is perceived to
be threatened by a multicultural France. This discourse posits the ideal
French citizen as engaged with public policy issues in purely secular
terms. Finally, the design of the institutional structures, that is the role of
the courts in relation to the legislature in France, is an important consideration. My claim is that these structures are inherently vulnerable (or
amenable  depending  on  one’s  perspective)  to  majorities,  and  that  consequently minority rights will never be well guarded in such a structure.
French doctrine of secularism.
11
     Kwame  Anthony  Appiah,  “The  Limits  of  Being  Liberal”  Global  Agenda  
Magazine  (2004)  online:  Global  Agenda  Magazine  <www.globalagendamagazine.
com>.

FREEDOM OF RELIGION . . . 45

The comparative study of the two countries is organized as follows:
ﬁrstly,  the  legal  systems,  general  text  of  the  constitutions  and  how  these  
relate   to   religion   in   society   will   be   compared;;   secondly   the   model   of  
church  and  state  relationship  in  both  countries  will  be  examined;;  thirdly,  
the discussion will be situated in the greater context of France’s approach  generally  to  the  management  of  diversity;;  ﬁnally  a  comparative  
analysis of the content and delineation of freedom of religion in both
jurisdictions will be undertaken.

I. GENERAL CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Several  pieces  of  legislation  –  constitutional  and  other  –  deﬁne  freedom  
of religion in France. The starting point is Article 10 of the Declaration
of the Rights of Man and the Citizen which states that:
No one may be disturbed on account of his opinions, even religious
ones, as long as the manifestation of such opinions does not interfere
with the established Law and Order.12

Article  10  is  important  in  that  it  signiﬁes  the  privatization  of  religion,  
presupposing that religious opinion ought to fall into the private sphere,
while simultaneously asserting that the expression of any opinion is
necessarily public and must not disturb the public order.13
This  privatization  of  religion  was  reafﬁrmed  in  the  Law  of  1905,14
which  many  consider  as  marking  the  beginning  of  “true”  French  secularism.15 Until that point religious institutions had been under State
control, their social utility publicly recognized.16 At least part of the underlying rationale for the separation was a view that the State ought to
12

Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen  art  X  online:  <http://conﬁnder.
richmond.edu>  [Article  10].
13
Michel  Troper,  “French  Secularism,  or  Laïcité”  (1999-2000)  21  Cardozo  L.  Rev.  
1274  [Troper,  “French  Secularism”].
14 Loi du 9 décembre 1905, Loi concernant la séparation des Eglises et de l’Etat,
J.O., 11 December 1905  [Law  of  1905]  [translated  by  author].
15
     Troper,  “French  Secularism”,  supra note 13.
16
Danièle  Hervieu-Léger,  “Redeﬁning  Laïcité  in  Multicultural  France”  in  Peter  L.  
Berger,  ed.,  The  Limits  of  Social  Cohesion  (Oxford:  Westview  Press,  1998)  38  at  44  
[Hervieu-Léger,  “Redeﬁning  Laïcité”].  
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be  supreme  as  it  “has  a  charge  of  men’s  souls  just  as  much  as  a  church  
of community, but in a more universal fashion.”17 Although the law itself  neither  contains  an  explicit  separation  nor  an  explicit  afﬁrmation  of  
laïcité, it does enunciate the refusal by the state to recognize any religion  and  at  once  reafﬁrms  freedom  of  conscience.  The  result  was  that  
the Republic no longer recognized, funded nor subsidized any religious
group.18
The next important document with respect to freedom of religion in
France is the preamble to the Constitution of 1946,19 which is expressly
afﬁrmed  and  integrated  as  part  of  the  Constitution  of  1958.20 It asserts
that  “each  human  being,  without  distinction  of  race,  religion  or  creed,  
possesses  sacred  and  inalienable  rights,”  thereby  afﬁrming  the  right  to  
be free of discrimination based on religion.
In   Canada,   both   freedom   of   religion   and   conscience   are   afﬁrmed  
in  s.  2(a)  of  the  Charter of Rights and Freedoms.21 The right to be free
from  discrimination  based  on  religion  in  turn  is  afﬁrmed  in  s.  15(1).22
Thus, freedom of religion in France, at least on paper, is not framed
in a drastically different manner from the way it is framed in Canada.
Both  constitutions  afﬁrm  a  freedom  to  choose  and  express  one’s  beliefs  
in the freedom of conscience, and a freedom to practice one’s religion,
17

     Charles  Renouvier  was  a  French  Philosopher  broadly  regarded  as  one  of  the  
architects  of  the  separation  of  the  church  and  state.  I  say  “at  least”  as  the  Law  of  
1905 is really part of a complex history of the development of the state in France
of  which  a  full  discussion  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper;;  Charles  Renouvier,  
“L’éducation  et  la  morale”  (1872)  La  Critique  Philosophique  279,  cited  in  Troper,  
“French  Secularism”,  supra note 13.
18
Art. 2 Law of 1905.
19
     France,  Constitution  (1946)  online:  <http://conﬁnder.richmond.edu>.
20
     France,  Constitution  (1958)  online:  <http://conﬁnder.richmond.edu>.
21
     “Everyone  has  the  right  to  freedom  of  conscience  and  religion”;;  Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms,  Part  1  of  the  Constitution Act,  1982,  being  
Schedule B to the Canada Act  1982  (U.K.),  1982,  c.  11  [the  Charter].
22
     “Every  individual  is  equal  before  and  under  the  law  and  has  the  right  to  the  equal  
protection  and  equal  beneﬁt  of  the  law  without  discrimination  and,  in  particular,  
without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex,
age  or  mental  or  physical  disability”;;  s.  15(1)  of  the  Charter.  It  is  worth  noting  that  
discrimination on the basis of religion is also prohibited in the federal and provincial
human rights legislation in Canada. The present discussion will be limited to the
constitutional context.
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commonly  referred  to  in  France  as  “liberty  of  cult.”23 Both constitutions
also similarly proclaim a right to be free from discrimination on the
basis of one’s religion. However, two important differences do emerge.
Firstly,  in  France,  secularism  is  explicitly  afﬁrmed  as  a  constitutional  
principle:
France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social
Republic. It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law,
without distinction of origin, race or religion. It shall respect all
beliefs. It shall be organized on a decentralized basis.24

No such doctrine or enunciation of the separation of church and state
appears in the Canadian constitution. A second important difference
also emerges between the two constitutional frameworks when one
considers unwritten or implicit constitutional principles. In the case of
Canada, the Court’s decision in the Reference re Secession of Quebec25
has important implications for the present discussion as the Court in
that case gave constitutional status to the principle of the protection of
minorities. This principle was subsequently explicitly extended to religious minorities.26 No such principle is found, expressly or impliedly, in
the text of the French constitution. There is also a tradition with respect
to minority rights present in the Canadian constitution, namely the s. 23
minority education language rights and the s. 35 recognition of existing
aboriginal and treaty rights, which is notably absent from the French
constitution.

23

     Julien  Taieb,  “Freedom  of  Religion:  from  France  to  the  United  States,  a  National  
Conﬂict  of  Law”  (2004)  4  Global  Jurist  Advances  1  [Taieb,  “Freedom”].
24
Supra note 20.
25
     [1998]  2  S.C.R.  217  at  79  [Reference  Re  Secession].
26
Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem,  [2004]  2  S.C.R.  551  [Syndicat  Northcrest].
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II. THE FRENCH APPROACH
1. Church-state model in France, the republican ideal, and its
implications for citizenship
In  his  work  “French  Secularism,  or  Laïcité,”27 Michel Troper highlights
the  difﬁculties  in  classifying  French  secularism  within  the  traditional  dichotomy where either church and state are separate or such a separation
is absent.28 He emphasizes that, although in France the secular state is
structurally separate from religion, this does not mean that the state abstains from propagating values.29 Thus, one could argue that the French
model really belongs in a third intermediary category characterized by
this function of propagating values.
As a result of this function, the content of the relationship between
church and state in France is anything but neutral. On the contrary, the
doctrine of laïcité propagated by the state plays an important role as
one of the normative ideals of French citizenship.30Although this is not
a new idea in French society, laïcité as a normative ideal is experiencing a resurgence of sorts in that it is being drawn on heavily in the face
of new challenges. As France grows increasingly pluralistic, religious
diversity   has   come   to   be   perceived,   at   least   by   some,   as   an   “obstacle  
to a citizenship conceived in terms of the autonomy of the individual,
gender equality, and the ability of individuals to place distance between
themselves and their community roots.”31
“A  clear  sign  of  the  times,”  Leruth  writes,  is  that  the  ‘Right’  in  France  
is no longer alone in suggesting that the preservation of national identity
ought to be a national priority.32  Many  point  to  the  publication  in  1989  
in  a  popular  French  newspaper  of  an  article  written  by  ﬁve  left-leaning  

27

Supra note 13.
     Troper,  “French  Secularism”,  supra note 13.
29
Troper,  “French  Secularism”,  supra note 13.
30
     Micheline  Milot,  “L’Ecole  et  la  diversité  religieuse  au  Canada  et  au  Québec”  
(Paper  presented  to  the  Perspectives  Canadiennes  et  Francaises  sur  la  Diversité,  
October  2003)  online:  <www.pch.gc.ca>.
31
Ibid.
32
Supra note 9 at 46.
28
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philosophers33 as one of the key events that sparked a heated debate on
laïcité  which  has  pervaded  French  society  for  the  last  ﬁfteen  years.  The  
article called on the government to take a tougher stance on the wearing
of Muslim headscarves in schools. The philosophers made three main
points34 in their appeal, many of which a 2004 law35  banning  “ostentatious”  religious  symbols  in  schools  picked  up  on.  Their  ﬁrst  point  was  
that the school’s mission above all is to train young people to act and
think like citizens of the Republic, stressing that citizenship involves
a duty to employ rational faculties of judgment to transcend personal
prejudices. They argued that the students’ religious a priori should not
interfere with the neutral classroom environment required to develop
these faculties. Their second point was an attack on the philosophy of
multiculturalism, arguing that the right to be different means nothing
if it is not met with a right to be different from one’s difference. The
school, they argued, should be a place of individual emancipation. The
authors argued thirdly that France must avoid tailoring public education
to  meet  the  needs  of  speciﬁc  communities,  as  this  runs  contrary  to  the  
value of universalism, which the school must preserve.
In order to fully understand the present construction of French identity that these philosophers are arguing should be preserved, one would
need to look at least as far back as the Revolution to see that, to some
degree,  French  identity  has  always  “depended  on  the  idea  that  citizenship   should   transcend   community   ties   and   deﬁne,   beyond   all   particularisms,   a   national   “we”   with   which   each   person   can   identify.”36 The
“Rousseau-inﬂuenced   revolutionary   hostility   to   intermediary   groups  
and ‘factions’ – associated with privileges, divisiveness, and corruption
– shaped a view of republican democracy as essentially unitary, permanently fragile and under threat.”37 It is as though a national conscious33

Elisabeth  Badinter  et  al.  “Profs,  ne  capitulons  pas!”  Le  Nouvel  Observateur  (2  
November  1989)  online:  Le  Nouvel  Observateur  <www.nouvelobs.com>  [translated  
by  author].
34
This summary refers to a summary and translation of the main arguments as cited
in  Leruth,  “French  National”,  supra note 9.
35
Loi nº 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004, J.O., 17 March 2004, 5190  [the  2004  law]  
[translated  by  author].
36
     Hervieu-Léger,  “Redeﬁning  Laïcité”,  supra note 16 at 57.
37
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ness developed over time, founded on this idea that the public sphere
requires  protection  from  the  intrusion  of  “particular  loyalties,  identities  
or groups, lest it allow the ‘general will’ to disaggregate into myriad
conﬂicting  private  wills.”38
Since the Revolution, the historical confrontation between a Catholic France and a laïque France has resulted in the establishment of a very
particular  and  jealously  guarded  identity;;  a  laïque country of Catholic
culture.39 Laborde argues that the struggle whereby the republican state
established itself in the face of a domineering Catholic Church resulted
in an assumption by the state of the spiritual mission previously entrusted to the church.40 The importance placed on the school in this debate
appears to have stemmed from this struggle. After centuries of struggle
and   a   ﬁnal   formal   separation   in   190541, the Republic was faced with
the  task  of  creating  “citizens”  out  of  “believers.”42 The school thus became  the  logical  place  in  which  to  “engage  in  a  strong  formative  project,  
aimed at the inculcation of the public values of democratic and egalitarian citizenship, and introduce an alternative set of civil symbols into the
public sphere, so as to lead citizens to endorse a robust public identity
capable of transcending more particular religious, cultural, and class
loyalties.”43
While   the   focal   point   of   the   tension   in   France   is   still   the   school,  
the  dynamic  of  the  conﬂict  no  longer  simply  involves  Catholicism  and  
republicanism diametrically opposed, vying over control of the public
space. The fact is that the operative community ties have changed and
the requirement that they be transcended appears to be posing different
challenges.  The  conﬂict  is  no  longer  with  religion  in  and  of  itself;;  the  
‘problem’  of  signiﬁcant  religious  and  cultural  diversity  has  been  added  
to  the  mix.  What  is  inherently  problematic  from  an  analytical  perspective is that the citizenry, and therefore the interests, have changed fun-
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     Hervieu-Léger,  “Redeﬁning  Laïcité”,  supra note 16 at 57.
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damentally yet this ideal of citizenship predicated on secularism at all
costs is still being called on to do all the work of reconciling.
2. Diversity in France
In  light  of  the  above  discussion  and  the  signiﬁcance  of  the  threat  (perceived  or  actual)  presented  by  diversity  to  the  state’s  promulgated  ideal  
of  citizenship,  it  is  worth  situating  the  conﬂict  in  France’s  broader  approach to diversity.
France,  like  many  other  Western  European  countries,  has  really  only  
dealt with large-scale immigration in relatively recent history. It was
not  until  after  WWII  that  immigrants  were  welcomed,  recruited  even,  
to provide labour during a time of rapid growth.44 The recession in the
1970s marked the end of this trend, and the beginning of serious efforts to slow, limit, and even cease immigration completely.45 The last
two decades have witnessed a very real hardening in the position on
immigration of all political parties, perhaps as a result of the growing
popularity  of  Jean-Marie  Le  Pen’s  Front  National.  In  2002,  Le  Pen  managed  to  ﬁnish  second  in  the  primary  presidential  election  running  on  an  
essentially anti-immigrant platform.46 Immigration has been blamed for
nearly every social ill in France, including unemployment and a rising
crime rate, not to mention the perceived threat to the country’s national
identity outlined above.47
Despite these sentiments, France has nonetheless become one of
the most multi-ethnic countries in Europe with the proportion of foreign-born  residents  at  around  10%  or  5.9  million  people.48 In general,
44
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     The  2001  census  in  Canada  revealed  that  immigrants  accounted  for  18.4%  of  the  
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France’s response to an ever increasingly diverse population has always
been a strong goal of integration and assimilation. The extent of this effort to assimilate is evident in the country’s law banning the collection
of   all   statistics   reﬂecting   the   religion   or   ethnicity   of   the   population.49
One   need   look   no   further   than   the   charred   remains   of   8,973   vehicles  
torched during the 20 nights of rioting in October and November of this
year to understand that these efforts to integrate and assimilate have not
been entirely successful.50  While  what  exactly  caused  and  perpetuated  
the riots is disputable, it is widely held that French society’s negative
perceptions of Islam and of immigrants and the resulting alienation felt
by  many  French  Muslims  was  a  signiﬁcant  factor.51
As French sociologist Alain Touraine points out, part of the problem is that the universalism that is so central to the French republican
model has led to a rejection and inferiorisation of those who are ‘different.’52 He argues that, while rejecting communitarianism has been a
positive outcome of this transcending of differences, the French model
is problematic in that it does not allow for the recognition of differences,
thus violating the right of each individual to have his or her freedom of
religion  and  cultural  afﬁliations  respected.  In  this  sense  he  argues  that  
France’s national ‘we’ that is guarded so jealously, is becoming a threat
to itself. Faced with a republicanism loaded with prejudice and aggressive  communitarianism,  he  argues  that  France  must  ﬁnd  a  way  to  combine integration and universalism with the recognition of differences
and respect for the cultural rights of all.
3. Freedom of religion in France
As mentioned earlier in the discussion of the general constitutional
framework, freedom of religion in France is protected in several legal
texts, namely Article 10 of The Declaration of the Rights of Man of
49
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1789,53 the preamble to the Constitution of 194654 and article 2 of the
Constitution  of  1958.55
Freedom of religion in French law is essentially composed of two
distinct  elements:  the  ﬁrst  is  freedom  of  conscience,  which  encompasses  
the right to choose and express one’s faith and consequently to not be
discriminated against on the basis of one’s religion and the second, referred  to  as  ‘liberty  of  cult,’  guarantees  the  right  to  “put  into  practice  
one’s religious commandments.”56 Liberty of cult basically precludes
the state from interfering with the doctrines taught, ceremonies, holy
days and the general internal functioning of a given religious community.57
As stated above, one of the milestones in the intellectuals’ rediscovery of the republican ideal was an open letter to the government published in a popular newspaper by a group of French philosophers urging
the government to take a tougher stance on headscarves in schools.58
This was in response to the much-publicised expulsion of two Muslim
schoolgirls who refused to remove their headscarves.59 Because of the
signiﬁcance  of  these  events  and  the  role  they  have  played  in  the  neo-republican  discourse  on  national  identity,  as  well  as  the  signiﬁcance  of  the  
school in any discussion of secularism in France, it makes sense to narrow the discussion of freedom of religion in France to how the debates
have played out in that context.
On the 15th   of   March   2004,   Statute   n.   2004-228,60 better known
around the world as the ban on Muslim headscarves in schools, was
enacted. Until that point, it had been the duty of judges at the Conseil
d’Etat61 (the  administrative  court)  to  balance laïcité and the right to free53
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dom of religion on a case-by-case basis, operating under an assumption
that the two could be reconciled. The statute is intended to end a decade
and  a  half  long  debate  otherwise  known  as  the  “headscarf  affair”  which  
began  in  1989  with  the  aforementioned  events.
These events prompted the Minister of Education to ask the Conseil
to advise on whether the wearing of symbols of belonging to a religious community is compatible with the principle of laïcité, given the
principles in the Constitution, the laws of the Republic and the rules
pertaining to the organization and functioning of public schools.62 In its
opinion, the Conseil handed down a set of guidelines stating clearly that
the headscarves were not in and of themselves in breach of the principle
of laïcité and that laïcité did not justify prohibiting religious expression.
Religious freedom could only be limited when it presented an obstacle to the accomplishment of the statutory mission of public education.
Thus, religious symbols could be prohibited when their display constituted an act of pressure, proselytism, propaganda or provocation, when
they  threatened  the  “good  order”  of  the  school  or  posed  a  threat  to  health  
and safety. The Conseil delegated the task of deciding on a case-by-case
basis whether these conditions were met to the school principals.
This   approach   proved   difﬁcult   to   implement   as   evidenced   by   the  
Kherouaa63 case, which the Conseil heard three years later. Essentially
the  guidelines  provided  in  the  1989  decision  were  entirely  disregarded  
when three Muslim girls were once again expelled from their public
school for violating a school rule prohibiting all distinctive symbols indicative of belonging to a religious, political or philosophical order. The
bulk  of  the  decision  is  actually  identical  to  the  1989  decision.64  In  ﬁnding that none of the conditions required for prohibition were either aladministration;;  Catherine  Elliott  and  Catherine  Vernon,  French Legal System
(Harlow:  Pearson  Education  Limited,  2000)  at  78  [The  French  Legal  System].
62
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leged or established, the Conseil overturned the decision and reinstated
the girls as students at the school.
Further   hostility   to   the   1989   decision   and   the   Court’s   attempt   to  
balance the principle of laïcité was demonstrated when the Minister of
Education published a regulation essentially calling on school principals   to   ban   “ostentatious”   religious   signs.  The   principles   invoked   are  
essentially those that later inspired the 2004 law.
In France, the national project and the republican project have
merged around a certain idea of citizenship. This French idea of the
nation and the Republic is, by nature, respectful of all convictions,
in particular of religious convictions, political convictions and of
cultural traditions. But it excludes the fragmenting of the nation into
separate communities, indifferent to one another, only considering
their own rules and laws, engaged in simple coexistence. The nation
is not just a collection of citizens holding individual rights. This
ideal is built initially at the school. The school is the premier place
of education and integration where all children and all young people
come together and learn how to live together and to respect each
other. The presence, in school, of signs and behaviours that show
that students cannot conform to the same obligations, nor take the
same courses and follow the same programs, would be a negation of
this mission. All discrimination, be it on the basis of gender, culture
or religion must be left at the door. This secular and national ideal
is the very substance of the school of the Republic and the basis of
the civic duty of education. This is why it is not possible to accept
the presence and the multiplication of symbols so ostentatious that
their effect is precisely to separate certain pupils from the common
rules of the life of the school. These symbols are, in themselves, the
elements of proselytism.65

The regulation provides substantial support to the argument above that
secularism in France does much more than negotiate the terms of the
relationship  between  church  and  state.  This  statement  afﬁrms  the  crucial  
role secularism plays in the republican ideal. The perceived threat to this
ideal and the emphasis on the school as the breeding ground for the new
French citizen are also immediately apparent.
It has been said that it was the situation of legal uncertainty, where
decisions were left to principals to make on a case-by-case basis, which
65
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prompted the legislature to step in and convene the Stasi Commission
which ultimately drafted the 2004 law.66 Although it is likely that the
lack of legal certainty was a factor, it seems impossible to conclude
from the above dialogue between the Conseil, the schools and the legislature  that  there  was  not  also  a  signiﬁcant  degree  of  hostility  towards  
the Conseil’s   interpretation  of   secularism  as   a  ﬂexible  principle   to   be  
reconciled with religious freedom.
The Stasi Commission, mostly composed of academics and politicians, was formed in July 2003 and was charged with the task of proposing a theoretical and practical framework for the revival of secularism in
the Republic.67 Most politicians defended the idea of adopting a statute
with some notable exceptions.68 Nevertheless, the report69 was adopted
unanimously  ﬁve  months  later.  The  report  made  several  recommendations for a new law on laïcité whose aim would be to, on the one hand
provide precise rules regarding the functioning of public services, and
on the other hand foster the spiritual diversity of the country.
The report made several recommendations with respect to a new
law on laïcité  including  a  proposed  ban  on  all  “ostentatious”70 symbols
demonstrating  a  religious  or  political  afﬁliation.  The  law  also  included  a  
proposal to make Yom Kippur71 and Eid al-Fitr72 pedagogical holidays,
a proposal to allow employees to choose one religious holiday a year as
an additional statutory holiday and a proposal to create a national school
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of Islamic studies73.  The  President  of  the  Republic  however,  chose  only  
to adopt the ban on religious symbols.
Overall, one could argue that the report is wholly inadequate considering its mandate which included such unrealistic goals as to change
mentalities  and  habits,  ﬁght  racial  discrimination  in  the  public  and  private spheres, impose a strict respect for laïcité in the public services,
and to enhance spiritual diversity, as all it did practically was enable the
adoption of the 2004 law.74
It is interesting to note what commissioners have said about the
Commission since the law’s adoption. At least one commissioner has
said that truthfully there was never any real debate over whether or not
there should be a law, rather only about what the law should contain.
He emphasized that there was a sentiment amongst commissioners that
an administrative guideline would not have been enough to assuage the
pressure  of  public  opinion  surrounding  the  issue;;  a  unanimous  vote  in  
favour of a statute was necessary. He also admitted that he felt the work
of the Commission was necessarily unbalanced as the most important
goal had always been to say ‘no’ to Islamic fundamentalism.75
As mentioned above, in some ways the law represents a certain hostility toward the courts engaging in a balancing act, trying to reconcile laïcité with the guarantee of freedom of religion. The Conseil was
prepared to assume the two principles could be reconciled and limit
freedom of religion only where it was necessary to, i.e. when there was
an act of pressure, proselytism, propaganda or provocation, where the
‘good order’ of the school was threatened or where a threat was posed
to health and safety. The effect of the 2004 law, in contrast, is to end the
competence of the Conseil to engage in this balancing exercise, thereby
making an implicit statement that laïcité  is  not  after  all  a  ‘ﬂexible  principle’ and imposing serious internal limitations on the right to freedom
of religion.
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III. THE CANADIAN APPROACH
1. Church-state model in Canada
The Canadian model of the relationship between church and state stands
in  stark  contrast  to  its  French  counterpart.  Whereas  the  French  relationship is characterized by its positive content, the Canadian one is very
much characterized by its neutrality. Rather than secularism being a
value or doctrine to be propagated in and of itself, secularism in Canada
exists to provide a framework within which tolerance and respect for
diversity are meant to be fostered. As such, it imposes a duty of neutrality on the state.
This duty of neutrality was perhaps most recently clearly enunciated
in  the  Supreme  Court  of  Canada’s  (the  “Court”)  decision  in  Lafontaine,76
in which the Court looked at whether the municipality of Lafontaine had
lawfully denied an application for rezoning to permit a congregation of
Jehovah’s  Witnesses  to  build  a  place  of  worship.  Lebel,  J.  wrote  that  the  
result of the clear distinction that exists between churches and public
authorities is that the state is now under a duty of neutrality. He goes on
to say that this concept of neutrality
allows churches and their members to play an important role in
the public space where societal debates take place, while the state
acts as an essentially neutral intermediary in relations between the
various denominations and between those denominations and civil
society.77

This  notion  was  equally  afﬁrmed  in  the  Court’s  decision  in  Chamberlain78 where it considered the meaning of strict secularism in the School
Act79 with respect to a decision by a school board to ban books depicting same-sex parented families. In holding that the school board ought
not to have banned the books, McLachlin C.J., writing for the majority,
76
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held that the requirement of secularism in the Act implied that, while the
board was free to address the religious concerns of parents, this must
be done in such a way as to give equal recognition and respect to other
members of the community. In holding that religious views ought not to
be  “left  at  the  boardroom  door,”  the  Court  stated  that  those  views  could  
nonetheless not be used to exclude the concerns of a minority group as
each  group  ought  to  be  “given  as  much  recognition  as  it  can  consistently  
demand while giving the same recognition to others.”80
In  a  sense  then,  the  state  is  not  so  much  a  player  in  these  conﬂicts  
as it is a referee, there to ensure that all parties with a stake are playing
by the rules. The state’s role is limited to ensuring81 that a proper legal
and social framework exists in which individuals and groups are able to
meaningfully exercise their freedom of religion while ensuring mutual
tolerance and respect for the diversity of opinions and convictions that
exist in a pluralistic society such as Canada. The state in France, on the
other hand, has itself an interest to be protected. The state is seen as a
crucial player, guarding against the threat that religion poses to an ideal
of citizenship founded on the autonomy of the individual and his ability
to place distance between himself and his community roots.82
2. Freedom of religion in Canada
In   Canada,   the   content   of   the   guarantee   in   s.   2(a)   of   the   Charter83 of
freedom of religion has been gradually shaped by the Court in its twenty
or so years of jurisprudence since the Charter came into effect. The
Court’s  deﬁnition  is  an  expansive  one  and  one  which  revolves  around  
the notion of personal choice and individual autonomy and freedom.84
It is interesting, preliminarily, to contrast this notion of individual autonomy as a right to be protected within the right to freedom of religion
with the French defence of the principle of laïcité which presumes that
80
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individual autonomy can only truly be achieved when an individual is
able   to   divorce   himself   from   his   religious   afﬁliations.  This   highlights  
the very different philosophies that imbue the two approaches when one
considers that this presumption, which is distinctly absent from the Canadian  approach,  does  so  much  of  the  justiﬁcatory  work  in  the  French  
approach.
Dickson  J.  (as  he  then  was)  ﬁrst  deﬁned  what  was  meant  by  freedom  
of religion in R v. Big M Drug Mart:85
T]he   essence   of   the   concept   of   freedom   of   religion   is   the   right   to  
entertain such religious beliefs as a person chooses, the right to
declare religious beliefs openly and without fear of hindrance or
reprisal, and the right to manifest religious belief by worship and
practice or by teaching and dissemination.86

Dickson J. also articulated the purpose of freedom of religion in
Big M:
[T]he   values   that   underlie   our   political   and   philosophic   traditions  
demand that every individual be free to hold and to manifest
whatever beliefs and opinions his or her conscience dictates,
provided inter alia only that such manifestations do not injure his or
her neighbours or their parallel rights to hold and manifest beliefs
and opinions of their own.87

The  content  and  deﬁnition  of  the  right  in  s.  2(a)  has  been  further  delineated by a number of cases. The Court in R v. Jones88 emphasized
that  a  trivial  effect  on  religion  will  not  breach  the  guarantee  in  s.  2(a).  
Thus,  s.  2(a)  does  not  require  the  legislature  to  refrain  from  imposing  
any burden at all on the practice of religion. In Jones, the appellant alleged that requiring him to apply to the school board for an exemption
for his children from mandatory school attendance so that they could
be home-schooled violated his freedom of conscience and religion as it
forced him to acknowledge the school board and not God as the source
of the right and obligation to educate his children. The Court did not
85
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accept that this represented more than a trivial effect on his freedom of
religion.
From time to time situations arise where rights within the Charter  itself  come  into  conﬂict.  In  deciding  whether  the  proposed  legislation extending civil marriage to same-sex couples89 was consistent with
the  guarantee  in  s.  2(a),  the  Court  discussed  how  a  ‘collision  of  rights’  
should be resolved.90 The Court reminds us that a limit on religious freedom   will   only   be   required   where   a   true   conﬂict   of   interests   is   made  
out91  before  explaining  that  when  such  a  conﬂict  does  arise,  it  must  be  
resolved  using  the  justiﬁcatory  principles  in  s.1  of  the  Charter to balance the interests at stake.92  The  Court  also  clearly  states  that  conﬂicts  of  
rights  do  not  represent  a  conﬂict  with  the  Charter itself, but rather that
these  conﬂicts  are  to  be  resolved  within  the  Charter.93
This approach was used by the Court in Trinity Western,94 a case in
which  Trinity  Western  University  (TWU),  a  private  institution  associated with the Evangelical Free Church of Canada, alleged that a refusal
by  the  B.C.  College  of  Teachers  (BCCT)  to  accredit  a  teacher-training  
program  on  the  basis  that  TWU  appeared  to  follow  discriminatory  practices  infringed  the  right  to  freedom  of  religion  in  s.  2(a).  The  concern  
was  that  the  ‘Community  Standards’  of  TWU  embodied  discrimination  
on  the  basis  of  sexual  orientation.  TWU  students,  faculty  and  staff  were  
asked  to  sign   a  document  agreeing  to  refrain  from  “practices  that  are  
89
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biblically condemned” including homosexual behaviour. The issue then
was  the  proper  deﬁnition  of  the  scope  of  the  right  to  freedom  of  religion  
and of the right to be free from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The Court explicitly stated that neither one is absolute and that
the  “proper  place  to  draw  the  line  is  generally  between  belief  and  conduct.”95 Thus, the freedom to hold a belief is broader than the freedom
to act on one.96 As the Court found no evidence that training teachers
at  TWU  would  foster  discrimination  in  the  schools  where  these  teachers would go on to teach, the Court held that their freedom to adhere to
certain beliefs should be respected. The BCCT was wrong to presume
a potential danger for the rights of others or the social order from religious doctrine. The Court was thus able to circumscribe the rights that
had  come  into  conﬂict  and  reconcile  them  within  the  Charter.  
In Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 1597 the Court held
that  the  New  Brunswick  Human  Rights  Commission  was  correct  in  ﬁnding that a school board had discriminated against the appellant and his
children in the provision of accommodation, services or facilities98 on
the basis of religion and ancestry when the board continued to employ a
teacher who publicly made racist and discriminatory comments against
Jews  in  his  off-duty  time.  This  case  is  signiﬁcant  because  although  the  
beliefs and opinions held by the teacher were held to be discriminatory,
LaForest, J., writing for the whole court, held that the teacher’s freedom
of religion was nevertheless infringed. He stated that assuming the sincerity of the beliefs and opinions, it is not open to the courts to question
their validity, thus leaving the task of reconciling competing rights to
the s. 199 analysis. This external limiting of the right is exactly the approach that France has departed from in refusing to balance freedom of
religion with the secularist goals of society.
The holding in Syndicat Northcrest 100 is related in that the Court
emphasized that there is no requirement, when invoking a right to religious freedom, to prove that beliefs are objectively valid with re95
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spect to other members of the same religion. Rather, once again, if
anything must be shown, it is only that a belief is sincere. A requirement to show an objective religious obligation would run counter to
the underlying purposes and principles of the right guaranteed in s.
2(a).    In  Syndicat Northcrest,101 Iaccobucci, J., writing for the majority, held that the by-laws of a condominium building that prevented
the appellants from building succahs102 on their balconies infringed
their religious freedom. The majority balanced the right to religious
freedom engaged against the co-owners’ rights to the peaceful enjoyment of their property and personal security protected in ss. 1 and 6 of
the Quebec Charter103 and held that the co-owners’ interests could not
reasonably be considered as imposing valid limits on the exercise of
the appellants’ religious freedom.

CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR JUDGMENT
Recalling the discussion at the start of this paper regarding the need for
the development of norms through which religious argument could be
included in pubic debate, it becomes apparent through a comparative
analysis that the legitimacy of religious argument may be totally precluded in a given jurisdiction by the content of the state-church relationship, the ideals of citizenship promulgated by the state, and the overall
design of the institutional structures.
Firstly, as evidenced by the comparison of the two countries, the
content  of  the  church-state  relationship,  or  speciﬁcally  whether  this  relationship has any content at all, matters greatly. In France, the state’s
101
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role as the propagator and guardian of the doctrine of laïcité has resulted in a conception of citizenship that is predicated on a notion of
individual autonomy in which an individual is not truly autonomous if
he  has  not  been  emancipated  from  his  religious  afﬁliations.  It  is  only  
once this emancipation has taken place that he is truly able to participate
fully in the community’s deliberations on the public good. In Canada, as
noted above, a very different view of individual autonomy with regards
to freedom of religion is espoused. It is apparent from the delineation
and  content  the  Court  has  given  to  s.  2(a),  that  a  notion  of  individual  
autonomy is seen as an essential part of what is being protected within
the guarantee of freedom of religion. Freedom of religion guarantees
not  only  a  right  to  “entertain  such  religious  beliefs  as  a  person  chooses,”  
but perhaps more importantly for this discussion, the right to hold and
manifest such beliefs is only limited by their actual injury to others’ parallel rights.104 This difference, coupled with the state’s role in Canada as
one of a neutral intermediary, results in there being much more potential
in the Canadian context for a view of religiously based policy positions
as legitimate.
The second apparent difference in the two approaches is highlighted
by the reaction in France to a perceived threat that multiculturalism poses to French national identity. As articulated above, French identity continues to depend on an idea of citizenship that requires one to transcend
community ties and abandon all particularisms so that all may come
together  to  deﬁne  a  national  French  ‘we’  with  which  each  person  can  
identify. It is probably not such a stretch to suggest that many Canadians
on the surface deplore the idea that one ought to rise above all else, to
be  French  ﬁrst  and  foremost,  in  order  to  ensure  a  seat  at  the  table.  But  is  
there  no  such  national  ‘we’  in  Canada?  Or  is  it  just  that  our  ‘we’  is  more  
immune  to  criticism  as  it  also  conveniently  claims  cultural  neutrality?  
Taylor  reminds  us  to  be  cognizant  of  the  fact  that  “[L]iberalism  is  
also  a  ﬁghting  creed.”105  What  distinguishes  Canada  from  France  then  
is  not  the  lack  of  a  national  ‘we.’  “Difference-blind”  liberalism,  which  
claims to offer a neutral ground on which people of all cultures can
meet, discuss, coexist, etc, in reality requires the separating out of the
104
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public from the private, or religion from politics.106 He argues that liberalism  “is  not  a  possible  meeting  ground  for  all  cultures,  but  is  the  political expression of one range of cultures, and quite incompatible with
other ranges”.107 Not only does liberalism necessarily exclude cultures
for which this separation is not possible, it has serious implications for
judgment using the enlarged mentality. The solution that Taylor proposes however, is compatible with the goals of Nedelsky’s theory: the
challenge in dealing with an awkwardness stemming from substantial
numbers of people who are citizens yet whose culture calls into question   the   philosophical   boundaries   of   a   given   society   is   to   “deal   with  
their sense of marginalization without compromising our basic political
principles.”108 Taylor emphasizes the need for recognition of the equal
value of different cultures, of the acknowledgement of their worth. All
cultures  in  a  multicultural  society  should  beneﬁt  from  the  presumption  
that their culture has value even if the concluding judgment is not that
the value is great.109 There is a parallel here to be drawn with Nedelsky’s theory, which explains that by actually listening to the content of
religiously based argument, those making judgments will be in a better
position to understand and take into account the sense of loss a religious community may feel when reforms are undertaken which involve
deep social transformation that runs counter to the positions of those
communities.110 In that sense, although Canada must not forget that its
liberalism is never neutral, within it there appears to be potential to accommodate what Nedelsky is calling for. France however, is in a different position and as such is not able to accommodate what Nedelsky calls
for.  The  difﬁculty  lies  in  that  participation  in  the  very  dialogue  on  the  
national ‘we’ is contingent on an individual or a community’s ability to
dispense with its cultural identity thereby precluding the very possibility of recognition.
Finally, whereas the Court in Canada has gone as far as elevating
the principle of the protection of minorities to constitutional status, it
appears that neither the constitutional documents, discourse nor insti106
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tutional structures in France are such that the same protection can be
afforded to minorities there. As mentioned in the discussion on the constitutional framework, there is no protection in France for minorities in
the actual constitution, nor has any substantive protection been found
implicitly.
Furthermore, the dynamic between the courts and the legislature has
shown that the result of disagreement and hostility between the two will
be an assumption by the legislature of the task of redirecting state policy
to conform with the ‘general will’. France’s parliamentary supremacy
stands in sharp contrast to Canada’s system of government, which has
been termed a constitutional supremacy.111 The implications for minorities  are  signiﬁcant.  The  Court  clearly  stated  in  Vriend112 that, while democracy  in  Canada  requires  that  “legislators  take  into  account  the  interests of majorities and minorities alike, all of whom will be affected by
the decisions they make,” that judicial intervention will be required to
correct a democratic process where the interests of minorities have been
denied consideration. It is arguable that these aspects of French governance,  contrasted  with  their  Canadian  counterparts,  conﬁrm  that  overall  
the institutional structures in France are too vulnerable to the will of majorities to facilitate the kind of judgment that Nedelsky is calling for.

AFTERWORD
Although the purpose of this study is not to decide exactly if, how, where
and when judgment using the enlarged mentality to include religious
perspectives would be possible, it is worth taking a moment to consider
what the implications are for Canada. It seems fair to conclude from the
above analysis and discussion that, at the very least, the conditions in
Canada do not totally preclude the possibility of taking religious perspectives. However, it is always important to bear in mind that the right
conditions may not be everything.
In June of 2004, former attorney general of Ontario Marion Boyd
was asked by the government of Ontario to conduct a review of the use
of religious arbitration in family law and its impact on vulnerable people, particularly women. The review was a response to public concern
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about  the  potential  use  of  Muslim  personal  law  (Sharia)  in  the  wake  of  
a controversial proposal put forth by the Islamic Institute of Justice to
establish  a  “Sharia  Court”  in  Ontario.  Despite  the  fact  that  family  matters have been arbitrated on the basis of religious teachings for many
years, there was intense fear that allowing Sharia arbitration could lead
to abuses and a consequent erosion of the equality rights of women. The
public discourse was, unsurprisingly, plagued by numerous misconceptions.113
It is well beyond the scope and purpose of this paper to delve into
the  issues  and  arguments  that  arose  as  a  result  of  this  process,  but  sufﬁce  
to say that what resulted is interesting and pertinent given the present
discussion. It is arguable that the process Marion Boyd engaged in
throughout her study represents a form of the judgment using the enlarged mentality that Nedelsky advocates for. The study involved very
extensive consultations of all interested groups114 and a series of recommendations was made based on those consultations. The recommendations included legislative and regulatory changes, changes to ensure accessibility to independent legal advice, public legal education programs,
programs for the education, training and regulation of mediators and
arbitrators and proposals for community development.
She  concluded  that  the  guarantee  to  freedom  of  religion  in  s.  2(a)  
mandated that peoples’ choices be respected as long as the choices or
results are not illegal.115 She wrote that
  [B]arring  Muslims,  or  any  other  identiﬁable  group  in  Ontario,  from  
arbitrating family law and inheritance matters, while others continue
to arbitrate according to the principles of their choice…would raise
the issue of whether the government was in violation of the Charter.
Given that the Arbitration Act provides a framework for arbitration
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for all Ontarians, the government should not exclude a particular
group of people on the basis of a prohibited ground.116

The   report,   entitled   “Dispute   Resolution   in   Family   Law:   Protecting  
Choice,   Promoting   Inclusion,”   was   submitted   to   the   government   of  
Ontario in December of 2004. Despite the commitment shown until
that point to listen to the various interested individuals and parties and
to meaningfully consider their perspectives, reality proved that what
Nedelsky is calling for demands much of a given society and that a
variety of challenges will inevitably arise. In September 2005, Ontario
Premier  Dalton  McGuinty  told  the  Canadian  Press  that  he  had  “come  
to  the  conclusion  that  the  debate  has  gone  on  long  enough  […]  There  
will be no Sharia law in Ontario. There will be no religious arbitration
in Ontario. There will be one law for all Ontarians.” Stating further that
religious  arbitrations  “threaten  our  common  ground,”  he  promised  his  
government  would  introduce  legislation  “as  soon  as  possible”  to  outlaw  
them in Ontario.117
It is likely that time will reveal the underlying reasons for this rather sudden and thus far unexplained policy decision. In the meantime
though, there may be important lessons to be learned. The experience
reminds   us   of   both   the   very   real   limits   of   our   allegedly   “difference-
blind” liberalism and that, occasionally, the ripeness of the conditions
will mean very little if there is no will to actually follow through with
the  perhaps  more  politically  difﬁcult  choices  that  follow  from  them.      
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